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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 001363

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2015

TAGS: [PARM](#) [KACT](#) [US](#) [RS](#) [UP](#) [BO](#) [KZ](#) [START](#) [JCIC](#) [INF](#)

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON
VANDENBERG, MAY 31, 2005

REF: A. STATE 53670 (JCIC-DIP-05-003)
[1](#)B. 04 GENEVA 02958 (JCIC-XXVI-036)

Classified By: Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

- [1](#)1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-013.
- [1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: May 31, 2005
Time: 10:30 A.M. - 12:07 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting was held at the U.S. Mission on May 31, 2005, at which all Parties were represented. The Parties discussed the Russian concern with the reattribution of ICBM silo launchers from the Vandenberg Test Range to the Vandenberg Space Launch Facility. The Russian Delegation said that the Treaty definition of "space launch facility" did not allow the launching of missile defense interceptors. Such facilities could only be used to launch ICBMs and SLBMs for space launch. The U.S. Delegation explained that the Treaty did not prohibit such use and that Treaty definitions do not create prohibitions. In response to questions from the Russian Delegation concerning START silo conversion provisions, the U.S. Delegation explained that the reattributed silos had been or would be modified, but they would not be "converted" as defined in the START Treaty.

REATTRIBUTION OF SILO LAUNCHERS AT VANDENBERG

[1](#)4. (S) At a Heads of Delegation Meeting at the U.S. Mission on May 31, 2005, Look stated that, since the previous JCIC session, the United States had reattributed five ICBM silo launchers from the Vandenberg Test Range to the Vandenberg Space Launch Facility (SLF). The United States had provided an explanation of this change through diplomataic channels (REF A); and, subsequently, the Russian Federation had placed the issue on the JCIC agenda. Boryak stated that the United States had created a new entity by reattributing the five launchers to the SLF. Referring to the long-standing Russian complaint regarding LF-21 and LF-23 at Vandenberg (REF B), he alleged that the United States was covering this violation of the Treaty by reattributing these launchers to the SLF. Russia was interested in learning which Treaty provisions had been applied, and in understanding the intended silo conversion process. He asserted that the Treaty anticipated delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space from SLFs and that he was perplexed because the United States informed Russia that it would use these launchers for operational interceptor missiles, not for space launch.

[1](#)5. (S) Look clarified that the United States had not created a new entity, but had added launchers to an existing SLF at Vandenberg. The Parties had discussed the use of these launchers in detail for several years and the United States had explained why these activities were compliant with the Treaty. Addressing the Russian position, he expressed concern that the United States and Russia have a significant difference in how we view definitions in the Treaty and whether basic prohibitions and limitations are imposed by those definitions. Rights and obligations are contained in various parts of the Treaty, but not in the definitions. Look explained that the only Treaty limitation for SLFs is the prohibition against flight-testing ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with reentry vehicles from SLFs and that the United States complies with this prohibition. Article V does not prohibit other activities at SLFs unless they are inconsistent with the Treaty or international law. He concluded that the Treaty does not restrict the launch of non-START missiles at SLFs.

16. (S) Shevtsov opined that, when drafting the Treaty, no one considered this situation, so this action may be in conflict with the Eighth Agreed Statement (sic) and the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Look responded that the United States has not converted these launchers under the Treaty, and the launchers are still subject to the Treaty as ICBM launchers at the Vandenberg SLF. The United States had been forthcoming in its plans because of other Parties' concerns with these launchers and not because the Treaty requires such information to be provided.

17. (S) Yegerov questioned whether the United States considered the definitions to be an equally legally-binding part of the Treaty. Look replied that definitions were an integral part of the Treaty, but that different parts of the Treaty serve different purposes.

18. (S) Yegerov posed several technical questions. He inquired whether the United States would convert all five launchers for interceptor use or retain some launchers for space launch. Look replied again that we were not converting the launchers under the provisions of the START Treaty, but that the United States is planning eventually to modify all five launchers. He added that, although not our immediate plan, we could not rule out future use of these launchers for space launch. In response to questions by Yegerov, Look replied that re-modifying the launchers for use with ICBMs was possible, but it was not a simple process and would take several months at least.

19. (S) Fedorchenko questioned Look on the difference between modification and conversion. Look responded that conversion is a technical Treaty term for changing a launcher from launching one type of ICBM to launch another type of ICBM. For the Vandenberg launchers, the United States has modified launchers to launch a missile not subject to the Treaty. Expressing concern about the Russian use of definitions, Look provided an example of how this logic could lead to problems for Russia. He explained that the definition of "production facility" in the Treaty does not include producing missiles other than ICBMs or SLBMs; however, the Votkinsk Production Facility produces SS-26 missiles that are not subject to the Treaty. He pointed out that this would be a prohibited activity under Russia's interpretation of how Treaty definitions are applied.

110. (S) Boryak replied that the Sixteenth Agreed Statement, as presented to the U.S. Congress, made it clear that silo launchers of ICBMs could only launch ICBMs. He noted that many aspects of this matter were still open for Russia. Look asked whether any of the Parties were interested in the United States' offer of a one-time visit to the five launchers (REF A). Responding to a question from Boryak, Look explained that the purpose of the visit was to serve as a transparency measure because of the Parties' existing concern with these launchers. Although the other Parties agreed to consider the visit, Boryak stated that any discussion of the visit remained an open question for later in the session.

111. (U) Documents exchanged: None.

112. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Dr. Look
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Dunn
Col(S) Emig
Mr. Foley
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Jones
Ms. Kottmyer
Mr. Kuehne
Mr. Miller
Mr. Mullins
Mr. Singer
Mr. Smith
LCDR Woods
Mr. French (Int)

Belarus

Mr. Grinevich

Kazakhstan

Mr. Baysuanov

Russia

Mr. Boryak
Col Fedorchenko
Mr. Kashirin
Ms. Kotkova
Amb Masterkov
Mr. Maksimenko

Mr. Novikov
Col Razumov
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Shabalin
Mr. Smirnov
Ms. Sorokina
Mr. Venevtsev
Mr. Yegerov
Mr. Uspenskiy (Int)

Ukraine

Dr. Shevtsov
Mr. Taran

13. (U) Look sends.
Moley